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Fiscal Decentralization in Asia
Challenges and Opportunities
This publication discusses the decentralization issues faced by countries of Asia and the
Pacific. It includes practical suggestions on how to proceed in this area to achieve economic
growth, macroeconomic stability, poverty and income distribution, services delivery
improvements, and political accountability. This note elaborates on adequacy of local
revenues and autonomy, expenditure management and clear service delivery mandates,
horizontal imbalances and limited use of incentives in intergovernmental transfers, financing
needs and local government borrowing, and local management capacities as the major
challenges in a decentralized fiscal architecture. The recommendations to address the above
challenges also note the long-term nature of these reforms.
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Introduction

D

ecentralization reform continues to play a prominent role in Asia after being on the public
policy agenda for several decades. As has happened in other countries around the world,
the roles and expectations for subnational governments have increased substantially in
most Asian countries since the 1990s. Currently subnational governments face a range of
challenges, including the global financial and economic crisis, rapid urbanization and demographic
changes, and environmental challenges and climate change, all of which increase the level of
difficulty for effective service delivery.
Although decentralization reform has been an evolving process, this process has not been linear,
and it has often been subject to moves toward recentralization. For example, in 2009 Pakistan
dissolved local governments and elected mayors, replacing them with appointed officials. But
at any rate the decentralization process continues to be a dynamic one in many Asian countries.
For example, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) there is a shift of emphasis from economic
development toward quality public services offered by subnational governments and greater
geographical equity to “build a harmonious society,” while in Indonesia, property taxes are finally
being decentralized and the basic laws from the “Big Bang” reforms of 1999–2001 are being
overhauled. In Japan, the government continues to implement the “Trinity Reforms” to provide
greater subnational fiscal autonomy; in Viet Nam progress has been steady and considerable but
challenges remain in terms of fiscal autonomy and political and administrative decentralization
at the lower levels; and in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Nepal there is
renewed interest in building sound systems of intergovernmental finance.1

1

This note draws upon recent information in Blane Lewis and Bob Searle, Asia-Pacific in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul
Smoke (eds.) Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy (GOLD), 2010; United Cities and Local
Governments.

1

The Centrality of the Fiscal
System

F

or subnational governments in Asian countries to meet their responsibilities and deal with
the challenges they will be facing in the future, there will be a need to strengthen their
intergovernmental fiscal systems in the following areas:

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

expenditure assignment and management,
local revenue generation and autonomy,
intergovernmental transfers, and
local government borrowing and investment finance.

This fundamental task is the main focus of this note. However, we must make it clear that other
institutional components also will need to be in place, including administrative decentralization
and political decentralization. The lack of strong, politically decentralized institutions continues to
be a challenge in a significant number of Asian countries.

2

The Extent of Decentralization
in the Region

I

f the extent of decentralization is measured by using the standard criterion of the share of
subnational governments in total expenditures (Table 1), many Asian countries exhibit among
the highest levels of decentralization in the world. Compare these with, for example, Australia
and New Zealand (Table 2). Also, there is great diversity in the region, with East Asia way ahead
of South Asia and Southeast Asia (Table 3).
We find that 70% of total expenditures are allocated at the subnational level in the PRC, 66% in
India, 60% in Japan, and 45% in both the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam. Measured by the share
of subnational governments in total revenues, the level of decentralization is lower, but still quite
substantial, at 40% in both the PRC and Japan, 35% in Viet Nam, and 33% in India. Note that the
vertical distribution also differs quite considerably across countries. Lower tiers are predominant
(versus upper tiers) in Indonesia, Japan, and the PRC. In India they are balanced at 33% for upper
and lower tiers in the case of expenditures (but not at all in the case of revenues).
However, all of these figures need to be interpreted with caution since the actual levels of
expenditure and revenue autonomy can be quite different from what is actually reported. For
example, as noted above, expenditure shares in India are balanced at 33% for upper and lower
tiers, but in reality lower tier governments in most Indian states have very little expenditure
autonomy from their state governments. Another example is the case of Viet Nam, where
despite the fact that subnational governments have a 35% share of total revenues, none of
these governments have discretion to change tax rates or any other aspect of the taxes assigned
to them.

Table 1

Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure
and Revenue in Asian Countries, 2009 (%)
Share of Total Public Expenditure

Country

Share of Total Public Revenue

Subnational

Upper Tier

Lower Tier

Subnational

Upper Tier

Bangladesh

15.0

5.0

10.0

2.0

1.0

Lower Tier
1.0

India

66.0

33.0

33.0

33.0

30.0

3.0

Indonesia

35.0

7.0

28.0

8.0

5.5

2.5

Japan

60.0

20.0

40.0

40.0

20.0

20.0

Korea,
Republic of

45.0

15.0

30.0

25.0

10.0

15.0

Pakistan

33.0

28.0

5.0

7.0

6.5

0.5

Philippines

25.0

11.0

14.0

10.0

2.5

7.5
continued on next page
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Table 1 continued

Share of Total Public Expenditure
Country

Share of Total Public Revenue

Subnational

Upper Tier

Lower Tier

Subnational

Upper Tier

Lower Tier

PRC

70.0

20.0

50.0

40.0

15.0

25.0

Thailand

10.0

5.0

5.0

2.0

1.0

1.0

Viet Nam

45.0

30.0

15.0

35.0

25.0

10.0

PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.

Table 2 Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure
and Revenue in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries,
2009 (%)
Share of Total Public Expenditure

Share of Total Public Revenue

Country

Subnational

Upper Tier

Lower Tier

Subnational

Upper Tier

Lower Tier

Australia

36.0

30.0

6.0

20.0

17.0

3.0

New
Zealand

9.0

n/a

9.0

8.0

n/a

8.0

n/a = not applicable.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.

Table 3 Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure
and Revenue across Continents, 2009 (%)
Local Revenues as Percentage
of Total Public Revenues

Local Expenditures as Percentage
of Total Public Expenditures

3.2

7.9

1.5

16.0

20.0

40.0

   Southeast Asia

5.3

15.5

Eurasia

n/a

26.5

Europe (2008)

13.0

23.9

Latin America

4.0

11.1

Africa
Asia
   South Asia
   East Asia

Middle East and Western Asia
North America

n/a

4.6

17.8

26.8

n/a = not applicable.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.

Main Issues and Challenges
in the Fiscal Architecture
Adequacy of local revenues and autonomy. Significant vertical fiscal imbalances are present in
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, and at the local level in the Philippines, the PRC, and Viet Nam.
In addition, revenue autonomy is low outside Japan and the Republic of Korea, and much less
in Indonesia and the Philippines. More autonomy, but only at the provincial level, exists in India,
Pakistan, and the PRC. Problems with the property tax are also prevalent; for example, in Indonesia
and the Philippines it is still a central tax. There is also inadequate diversification of the local tax
base, and in the Republic of Korea, a multiplicity of nuisance taxes exists, while in Cambodia
assignments from 2001 were never implemented. A relative neglect of fees and user charges is
also encountered, with some exceptions. Problems balancing local and central roles in revenue
collections exist in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan (central and provincial), the PRC, and Viet Nam (all
central).
Expenditure management and service delivery. A lack of clarity in expenditure assignments is
quite prevalent; this is more of a problem in the Republic of Korea and Thailand, and in India at the
state–local level. This is much less of a problem in Japan. Inappropriate expenditure assignments
are also problematic, for example, “unemployment and social insurance schemes” in the PRC
assigned at the local level. Unfunded expenditure mandates are a growing issue in Bangladesh,
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, and the Philippines.
Budget discretion. Sufficient budget discretion is an issue in Indonesia and Viet Nam, but not in
Japan or the Philippines. The continued use of off-budget operations in the PRC continues to be
a problem, and previous budget approval and control by higher level authorities is an important
issue in Bangladesh and the PRC (at the subprovincial level). In Viet Nam, provincial governments
have almost complete control over local government. Incentives for local expenditure efficiency
are lacking, and generally the quality of public services is quite low, outside Japan and the Republic
of Korea.
Intergovernmental transfers. Throughout the entire region, heavy reliance and dependence on
transfers and revenue sharing can be found. In addition, there is a lack of attention to horizontal
fiscal imbalances and the design of equalization grants: the PRC, despite very large fiscal disparities
across provinces and local governments, still implements trivial equalization grants. Complex
conditional or specific transfer designs are also found, for example, in the Republic of Korea
and Thailand. Also, there is only limited use of incentives-innovative transfer mechanisms (e.g.,
performance-based grants). India has introduced incentives for budget performance; the Republic
of Korea offers traditional conditional grants; and Japan and to some extent Bangladesh have
incentives for tax effort. In Indonesia they have been discontinued. In the Philippines there are
transfer intercepts for loan repayment. Viet Nam is using local service scorecards.
Local government borrowing and investment finance. Local government borrowing and fiscal
responsibility frameworks are lacking or problematic. In India borrowing takes place to cover
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current budget deficits and is common at all levels of government; in the PRC, local governments
are not allowed to borrow but their actual debt levels threaten instability; and in Japan subnational
debt is one-third of gross domestic product. Local governments, such as those in Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Thailand, often have poor and unreliable access to credit. Special intermediate
institutions to lend to local governments are rare; the Philippines is an exception. Central bailouts
are not a problem so far; automatic intercepts of transfer funds are used in only a few countries.
Low revenue autonomy is not conducive to borrowing.
Management capacity. Variations in management capacity are large in the region. Several
countries exhibit excellent to good quality tax administration and expenditure management:
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and to a slightly lesser extent the PRC and Viet Nam. Subnational tax
administration and expenditure management show inefficiencies in countries like Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, but several reforms are under way. India and Pakistan have a weak tax
administration at the subnational level. Expenditure management practices are also generally weak,
even with the secondment of central government employees. At the bottom we have Bangladesh
with rather weak and sometimes corrupt tax administration implemented in a deconcentrated
fashion. Does a genuine desire to decentralize exist? There is a need to clarify legislation and
development of local government in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, and
Sri Lanka. In Malaysia, the “One Malaysia” policy has led to centralization.

The Way Forward

D

ifferent countries in the region are at different levels of development and refinement of
their decentralized fiscal frameworks. The recommendations that follow, therefore, apply
to different countries to different extents, covering a broad range of development, from
very nascent stages to those which only require refinements.

An Agenda for Reforming Expenditure Assignment and Management
A clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities should be at the top of national reform agendas
for local government finance. The following topics must be addressed:
(i)
(ii)

Exclusive responsibilities must be identified.
For concurrent competencies specific responsibilities for various aspects—regulation,
financing, and implementation—must be assigned.
(iii) Higher level controls on local expenditures must be appropriately limited.
(iv) With limited administrative capacity, asymmetric assignments between central and local
governments should be considered.
(v) Methods to translate responsibilities into expenditure needs and financing requirements
should be developed.
(vi) Unfunded mandates must be avoided.
(vii) Funding and staffing of deconcentrated offices of line ministries should be downscaled or
eliminated if services are devolved.
(viii) Implementation of expenditure decentralization needs to be strategic (capacity building
and technical assistance).

An Agenda for Improving Local Revenue Generation and Autonomy
The overarching goal should be to increase reliance on own revenues with meaningful discretion.
In addition
(i)
(ii)

reforming and modernizing property tax administration must be a priority; and
diversifying subnational tax bases:
a) avoiding nuisance taxes and economic distortions;
b) creating a shortlist of other good local taxes: vehicle taxes, business license taxes, and
betterment levies on real estate;
c) implementing business taxes which offer opportunities (using sales turnover as a proxy,
but avoiding conflict with national value-added taxes);
d) furthering local tax autonomy through introduction of a local “piggyback” personal
income tax with a flat rate and possibly payroll taxes; and
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e) Implementing “green” taxes related to waste management, water- and air-polluting
activities, and the production of energy.

An Agenda for Reforming Intergovernmental Transfers
Reforming intergovernmental transfers has several requirements. Among them are the following:
(i)
(ii)

assuring predictable, regular, and transparent transfer mechanisms;
securing an appropriate balance among the various types of transfers (using separate
instruments for separate goals);
(iii) expanding and improving the use of equalization transfers based on a formula using
measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and introducing an explicit rule for
the pool of funds to be distributed determining the source in origin (fraternal—or
contributions by richer jurisdictions versus vertical—or contributions by the central
government, and in the latter case, also determining the amount as a percentage of
central government revenues);
(iv) reviewing and improving mechanisms for allocating resources under conditional grants
(rule based as opposed to discretionary);
(v) consolidating specific grants where large numbers of poorly coordinated programs exist
into fewer “block” grants—providing larger but still conditional discretion to subnational
governments;
(vi) implementing performance-based grants for encouraging budget process reforms and
improvements in service delivery; and
(vii) rationalizing capital grants (what is being pursued) and coordinating with borrowing
policies.

Local Government Borrowing and Investment Finance
To varying degrees, many countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, allow for
local government borrowing within a regulated framework. Prudent, fiscally responsible local
government borrowing needs to be promoted in many countries in the region. Legal and
regulatory frameworks for local government borrowing need to be strengthened in places such
as the PRC. Options and support mechanisms for local government borrowing must be expanded,
including support, where appropriate, to intermediate financial institutions or municipal
development funds (such as in the Philippines). Given the needs for public infrastructure, other
financing mechanisms should have wider adoption (tax increment financing, betterment levies
[valorization], and public–private partnerships).

Better Framing of Institutional Reform
The reforms above should be reinforced by other measures of an institutional nature:
(i)

Strengthen regular and systematic dialogue between subnational governments and the
central government on intergovernmental financial policy.

The Way Forward

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Address government fragmentation and address existing scale-vs.-representation issues
(Bangladesh with five levels, and very high fragmentation in Thailand).
Where deconcentrated units coexist with decentralized governments, identify the right
roles for and interactions between deconcentrated and devolved government entities.
Rethink the role of parallel institutions (social funds, etc.) to subnational units and try to
limit them and incorporate them into the main subnational government stream.
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Concluding Thoughts

E

ach country is unique; the basic reform principles aforementioned need to be tailored to the
economic, political, fiscal and social realities of individual countries. While there is no point
in pursuing reforms that are politically infeasible, it is also important to strengthen horizontal
accountability and make decisions about reform based on good information and evidence. There
is considerable value-added to regional and global cooperation, sharing experiences, and learning
by doing, in pursuing subnational finance reform.
Governments in the region should invest in building subnational administrative capacity, especially
at the local level.
It needs to be recognized that getting decentralization right can take quite some time, and the
process is almost never a linear one because of its high level of political content. Even when
institutions which are decentralized from fiscal, administrative, and political perspectives are
working well, we should expect these institutions to evolve and change over time. Decentralization
is a continuous process, and not a stage that once reached remains immutable.
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